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THE NATURE AND HABITAT OF MIND 
GEORGE P . .AD.AMS 
Any organized body of knowledge, whether in science or in 
philosophy-if one may suppose .for the moment that somewhere, 
in some philosophy there is valid knowledge-exhibits the pres-
ence of two components. There are first, diverse items, data 
or facts, and secondly, there is some one or more principle of 
selection, arrangement, and organization by virtue of which the 
various facts fall into some sort of system. In saying this I 
make no assumption as to the metaphysical or existential status 
of the particular facts and events which are assembled in an 
organized body of knowledge, or of the principles of organiza-
tion and relationship which define the nature of the enveloping 
structure. This distinction between form and matter-for such 
it is ('matter' taken in the Greek and not in the modern sense) 
-applies equally to a thoroughgoing realism according to which 
the categories are supposed to be just as independent of any 
constnrntive mental processes as are the perceived facts and 
events of nature, and to an idealism or pragmatism which 
regards mind or minds as actively engaged in organizing and 
reorganizing the stuff of experience. Any organized assemblage 
of items, a crystal, an animal body, the books in one's library, 
statistical weather observations arranged and interpreted in a 
treatise on Meteorology, a metaphysical system of the universe, 
all these are comprised of a variety of particular facts, events, 
and aspects, selected and arranged in a certain way. 
But there appears to be a difference between science and 
philosophy with respect to the relative part played by observable 
data on the one hand, and organizing, form-giving principles 
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on the other hand. These latter admit in science of a wider 
acceptance; they command an allegiance more universal and 
widespread, even if more tacit, among scientists than is the case 
among _philosophers with respect to the formative principles 
which guide their selection of and their reflection upon the facts 
of experience. For, even in those growing and critical periods 
of science when rival hypotheses of wide scope and generality 
are contending for mastery-an emission or undulatory theory 
of light, a nebula or _planetessimal hypothesis concerning the 
origin of the solar system-a decision is effected by an appeal 
to a body of facts recognized in common by everyone as belong-
ing to the universe of discourse of the science in question. And 
within this universe of discourse there are recognized wider and 
more inclusive categories than those with which the specific con-
tending theories are concerned. It is this common recognition 
which, in science, makes ultimate agreement possible. The con-
tinuity of events in space and time ( or spaces and times), .the 
conservation of mass and energy, stand for beliefs which are the 
common property of the advocates of competing hypotheses and 
theories in ·the _physical sciences. But _philosophers fail to ag-ree 
both as to the universe of discourse within which they are to 
draw their facts, and also as to the commanding _principles which 
determine or at any rate color their interpretation of these facts. 
Experience seems to show the extraordinary difficulty of framing 
a philosophical question so unambiguously that, by means of 
a _patient and detailed analysis of some situation present to 
experience, a common agreement may be reached. Do the 
neurone fibers touch one another or are there synapses in the 
brain tissue, is a question that can be settled by an appeal to 
the facts. But the question whether sense data are physical or 
mental continues to be discussed because, among other things at 
least, _philosophers cannot agree to the meaning of the terms 
'physical' and 'mental,' and their disagreement arises from the 
conflict between fundamental organizing ideas, habits of thought, 
and selective interests which determine the connotation and 
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the denotation of the terms 'physical' and 'mental.' Every 
philosophy seizes upon what it supposes to be some deep and 
characteristic motive or idea of the universe or of experience, 
and it erects this motive or idea into a principle of organization 
and of interpretation in accordance with which large ancl varied 
tracts of experience may be seen in a single perspective. I am 
drawing no moral from this unless it be that, in Santayana's 
words, '' it would be well for us, since we must be biassed and 
fragmentary, to cultivate as many different ways as possible 
of depicting the universe,'' or in Whitehead's injunction, '' seek 
simplicity and distrust it.'' I should not think it necessary or 
wise to say that the strife of philosophical ideas is a mere echo 
of conflicting temperaments and subjective interests. It is 
rather a rivalry between concepts, each of which is a selective 
and organizing principle, chosen both because it represents a 
real aspect or grain of the world, and also because it makes some 
appeal to the philosophical imagination. Philosophy is cer-
tainly not poetry, but I do not think we are entitled to· say 
either that it is science, or that it should aim to be quite the 
same sort of thing as science. 
These preliminary remarks are intended to explain and to 
justify the plan which I shall follow in this paper. I am to 
discuss the nature of mind, and the kind of world in which mind 
lives, its habitat. If I were a zoologist, and were to undertake, 
say, to describe the structure of the earthworm .AUolobophora 
and the nature of its habitat I should, I suppose, through dia-
grams and scientific description report to you concerning a 
specific field of facts and processes which all of you ,voulcl 
recognize as relevant to the task in hand. But unfortunately, 
in describing mind and its habitat, the procedure is much less 
certain and direct, not so much because mind is, or is thought 
to be, something non-physical, but because the region of facts 
to which you appeal-and you can appeal to nothing else-
depends upon your choice and your use of large and often vague 
directive and formative ideas. The behaviorist and introspec-
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tionist, the realist, idealist, and pragmatist, do not report the 
same things about mind and its habitat because the organizing 
principles leading to their selection, description, and interpre-
tation of facts are different. .And • if the organizing principle, 
the particular bias of a philosopher, is challenged he will prob-
ably appeal for its vindication to the very body of facts, the 
specific universe of discourse, which is defined by the principle 
in question, and he then wonders why other philosophers do 
not agree with him. Instead, then, of trying to bring before 
you a mind within a habitat and asking you ·to see what they 
both are, I propose first to consider .a certain pregnant and 
directive organizing principle by means of which many philoso-
phers believe that they can discover and articulate the nature 
and habitat of mind. 
This principle is a formative idea which is confined to no 
one type of philosophical doctrine as types are commonly labeled ; 
it cuts across otherwise quite diverse philosophical stnictures. 
The motive in question is that of· envisaging reality, so far as 
the problem of mind is concerned, as the scene in which the life 
processes of organized bodies are engaged in an active commerce 
and intercourse with the objects and events which constitute 
their effective environment. ,Vhat we call mind is to be defined 
and interpreted in terms of such a togetherness, contact, and 
mutual interaction of animal bodies, and the physical objects 
and events comprised within their physical environment. Here 
is an intellectual framework which, on the part of thinkers who 
adopt it, provides a mold in which every question concerning 
the nature and habitat of mincl is framed, and which predeter-
mines the outlines, at least, of an answer to such questions. 
There are at least three powerful motives which have contributed 
to the a_doption of this guiding framework and principle. If, as 
Burnet has suggested, an alternation of the mathematical or 
analytic and the biological interest is characteristic of the entire 
development both of scientific thought and of philosophy, then 
it may be said that this interpretation of mind in terms of the 
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life processes of animal bodies interacting with their environ-
ment issues from that dominance of biological concepts which is 
characteristic of so much nineteenth century philosophy. But 
this conceptual framework appeals also to that philosophical 
motive which can be described as the love of continuity. For, 
the life processes which com.prise an animal body are continuous 
with the rest of nature in two senses. 'l'hey are parts of the 
same space-time continuum of which all physical objects and 
events are, in .Alexander's phrase, specific configurations. .Also, 
such a continuity appears to imply that animal bodies are com-
present with other physical objects and events with no interven-
ing or representative stuff of consciousness or ideas. .Animal 
bodies are next to and immediately contiguous with environing 
objects and processes, themselves continuous with more distant 
and remote events in the space-time continuum of nature. The 
interpretation of knowledge in terms of immediacy, of a direct 
presentation of objects to the mind or body of an animal 
org·anism, or in terms of the effective and direct working over, 
reorganization, and control of the environment, issues from this 
motive of continuity. 
The third motive which plays a part in the interpretation 
of mind in terms of the contact between animal bodies and their 
environment is this. Processes live in time, and time is an 
abstraction, as Whitehead urges, from the '' passage of nature,'' 
'' its development, its creative advance.'' The belief in the 
reality of time, the motive which Lovejoy has characterized 
negatively as '' the obsolescence of the eternal,'' finds expression 
in the identification of mind with the processes which comprise 
an animal bocly in its intercourse with a nature which itself is 
a '' passage of events.'' I do not mean to imply that any thinker 
who takes time seriously is thereby of necessity committed to 
an interpretation of mind in terms of the processes of animal 
bodies. But this motive, when joined to a biological bias and the 
motive of continuity, leads to the rejection of any view according 
to which mind is the witness to some significant whole structure, 
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such, for instance, as is represented by traditional idealism. 
These motives lead also to the rejection of any view according to 
which the characteristic achievement of mind is definable, not 
in terms of process, but in terms of essences and ideas, meanings 
and forms, whose locus does not lie in the passage of events. 
The belief that the salient clew to the nature and habitat . 
of mind is to be found in the active intercourse of an animal 
body with its natural environment is a characteristic presuppo-
sition or directive idea in diverse types of philosophical synthesis 
as well as of psychology. I propose to discuss three types of 
philosophy which give expression to this motive. All of them 
report that :rr;i.ind is to be found only where animal bodies of a 
sufficient degiree of complexity are engaged in an active inter-
course with their environment. But this well grounded o bser-
vation, which no authentic experience appears to discredit, is 
made the basis for the further statement that the whole nature 
of mind is exhaustively to be defined in terms of the int_eraction 
between life processes and environing objects. The three dis-
tinct ways in which, in current discussions, such a task is essayed 
are these. First is the view variously called the relational 
theory of mind, the searchlight theory, the cross-section theory, 
or the perspective theory. It was :first clearly formulated, I 
think, in James 's essay '' Does Consciousness Exist 1 '' and is 
now identified with the writings of the Neo-Realists. The life 
processes of animal bodies which are here important are the 
specific neural responses which select out from the total environ-
ment those objects or aspects which are the effective stimuli of 
the organism's sense organs. The objects thus selected out by 
the neural responses constitute the :field of consciousness, of 
objects perceived, imagined, and felt. A perceived object is 
identical with the real object in space and time, only in being 
perceived it enters into a new context determined by the selec-
tive neural responses of the organism. Mind becomes a name 
for the :field of objects, events, and relations focussed in a specific 
perspective which is determined by these neural responses of 
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the body. Thus defined, mind cannot be said to inhabit an 
animal body. All that can be said is that the neural responses 
which define the field of objects identified with mind are those 
processes of animal bodies which are directed upon and which 
respond to objects. This type of theory then certainly takes its 
origin from the concept of life processes interacting with por-
tions or aspects of the environment. 
Alexander-I come to a second form of the process-object 
hypothesis, as we may call this basic, organizing idea-rejects 
the relational, objective theory of mind. But for him, equally 
with the Neo-Realists, wherever there is mind there is the inter-
course or compresence of a bodily, neural process and an environ-
ing object. Only, what we call mind or consciousness is declared 
to be identical with a bodily process; it is a '' process with the 
distinctive quality of mind or ·consciousness in the same place 
and time with a neural process, that is, with a highly differen-
tiated and complex process of our living body.' '1 To be _con-
scious is to ''enjoy'' these bodily processes, to experience them 
from the inside. The object, on the other hand, is "contem-
plated.'' But the contemplation of the object, its being felt, 
perceived, or known, is itself an enjoyment. Here too, then, 
we· have an interpretation of mind in terms of the intercourse 
between the life processes of complex, highly developed animal 
organisms and physical objects. 
A third and differing type of theory, but one which works 
within the general limits of a process-object concept, is afforded 
by Pragmatism. For Dewey, mind is certainly not identified 
eith~r with the field of objects selected by neural responses, nor 
with the acts of enjoyment which constitute the inner side of_ 
bodily processes directed upon and compresent with objects. 
The active, practical intercourse between the organism and its 
environment is the behavior or experience of the organism. 
What we call mind or states of consciousness '' are but the cross-
sections of the flow of behavioT, arrested for inspection, made 
1 S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, II, 5. 
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in order that we may reconstruct experience in its life history.' n 
Or, as he puts it in another place, '' if it could be shown that 
psychology is essentially not a science of states of consciousness, 
but of behavior, conceived as a process of continuous readjust-
ment, then the undoubted facts which go by the name of sensa-
tion, perception, image, emotion, concept, would be interpreted 
to mean peculiar (i.e., specifically qualitative) epochs, phases, 
crises in the scheme of behavior. " 3 Thus, take the case of 
perception. Instead of saying that a perception is a mental 
event or content, and as such a moment in or a fragment of the 
stream of consciousness, one ought rather to say that the self, 
i.e., the organism is contained in the perception. A perception is 
a natural event, a phase of behavior, an incident in the inter-
course between the organism and the environment. A percep-
tion is not presented to a self, but '' the organism is involved in 
the occurrence of the perception in the same sort of way that 
hydrogen is involved in the happening-producing-of water.' '4 
Here then are three different ways in which :the nature and 
habitat of mind are interpreted when one thinks in terms of the 
active intercourse between the life processes of bodily organisms 
and objects in the natural environment. Mind inhabits either 
the objects selected by specific neural responses (Neo-Realism), 
or the neural responses themselves (Alexander), or the critical 
and problematic phases in the '' flow of behavior'' (Dewey). For 
each of these three views the habitat of mind is located some-
where in the situation defined by the intercourse between animal 
bodies and their physical environment, and the nature and 
function of mind is wholly relevant to such intercourse. Com-
mon to these three types of theory as to the nature and habit'at of 
mind is the rejection of any belief in a specific stufl' of conscious-
ness which exists· as the mind's contents .or data, as the material 
2 Dewey, The Infiiience of Darwin upon Philosophy and Other Essays, 
p. 263. 
a Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 221. 
4 Dewey, Joiirnal of Philosophy, VIII, 552. 
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which the mind has before it and with which it works. In these 
views the mind, identified with or inhering in the bodily organ-
ism, has before it objects selected from the physical environment 
of the bodily organism. Only, in Alexander's view, conscious-
ness is a specific quale, and then only of the neural responses 
of the organism with which the enjoyments characteristic of 
consciousness are identified, and not of the objects contemplated 
by or present to such conscious enjoyments. For Dewey an idea 
stands for such objects in the behavior continuum as are the 
antecedents and the provocative conditions of intelligent, con-
trolled behavior. And Neo-Realism identifies both consciousness 
and its contents with the total field of objects selected by the 
specific neural responses. Now those theories of mind according 
to which ideas, as something other than 1Jhysical objects, play 
no significant role in defining· the nature of mind, are all of 
them theories which issue from the directive concept of bodily 
life processes interacting· with the physical environment; and 
this fact sug·g·ests that theories· of mind in which ideas do play a 
conspicuous part take their rise from some different organizing 
principle. I propose now to set forth certain considerations. 
and motives in the light of which the entire life and habitat of 
mind are not adequately to be described in terms of the inter-
course between animal bodies and their physical environment. 
We shall then be in a position to formulate an alternative point 
of view, a different directive concept, and to weigh its compara-
tive merits and adequacy. I shall mention several such motives,. 
ranges of describable facts about the actual life of mind as we 
know it which, at the very least, set serious problems for those, 
who interpret mind soleiy in terms of the life process-physical' 
environment concept. Moreover, they are motives which, taken 
together and in their total bearing, suggest one or more di:ffe,rent 
types of theory regarding the nature and habitat of mind. 
The first two of these motives may be described as co,Tucerned 
with two aspects of a process in which the life activities of 
organisms come to be separated by a gap or distance fr0m. their 
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environing objects, and in which such a gap comes to be filled in 
with specific contents of consciousness, i.e., ideas. To speak 
thus is confessedly to use a metaphor. But the metaphorical 
expression of a gap or distance between the activities of the 
organism and the environing objects is merely a way of describ-
ing a break or pause in the continuity of life processes with the 
objects in the environment which such processes require for their 
completion and their satisfaction. Where a stimulus arising 
from an objective situation leads uninterruptedly to its appro-
priate response, as in the case of instinctive behavior, the con-
tinuity between the organism and its world is maintained, and 
the entire situation appears to be describable in terms other than 
those of consciousness, of ideas. The origin of consciousness 
vmuld appear to be coincident with some break in the continuity 
between organism and environment, between stimulus and 
response, between organic needs and activities and t~e ful-
filment of those needs which derive from the world in which the 
organism lives. Consciousness appears '' at those points where 
there is incapacity on the part of the purely physiological 
mechanism to cope with the demands of the surroundings.' '5 
Instead of a physiological mechanism interacting with objects 
immediately and directly we have, when this discontinuity and 
gap become sufficiently established, a self holding commerce with 
its world through the medium of ideas, of meanings and symbols, 
of scientific generalizations and theories. Between the life 
processes of the biological organism and the. objects which 
impinge upon them, there comes to be inserted the region of 
ideas, of contents of consciousness. 
We now recognize that between primitive man ancl nature 
there existed a thick veil of ideas, habits of thought woven of 
fancy ancl superstition, following a pattern different from that 
of our scientific thinking. Can we now describe the progress 
of our knowledge of nature as the result of breaking through 
this primitive veil of ideas, discarding any such medium, and 
5 Angell, Psychology, p. 50. 
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coming more and more to see nature face to face1 Or, must 
we describe such progress as the discovery and the elaboration 
of a more adequate system of ideas which still intervene between 
us and nature, but intervene as do telescopes and microscopes, 
revealing deeper ranges of nature's life than would be accessible 
to us without them t I think that the latter alternative points 
to the more adequate answer, and I shall presently return to 
this question. But before doing so we may turn to another 
sort of idea, that which is involved in desire, and observe that 
the emergence of desire implies a similar tension and break in 
the continuity of organism and environment. If every conation 
and impulse, every want and need of the organism were imme-
diately satisfied by some appropriate object ready at hand in 
the environment, desires would not come into being. Desire 
originates in a tension, a discrepancy, a distance between the life 
activities of the organism and the objects which will satisfy and 
fµlfil these conations. The absence of the appropriate satisfac-
tion or of the object capable of yielding satisfaction calls forth 
the idea of the object, and that idea fills in the gap between the 
organism and its world. Desires appear to live midway between 
two extremes. At the lower limit there is the immediacy of 
impulsive satisfaction, the unbroken continuity of life process 
and environment. There is no place here for desire because 
such continuity is unimpaired. At the upper limit there is the 
immediacy of aesthetic enjoyment and contemplation, where the 
mind is absorbed or identified with the object contemplated, 
ancl in this case desire is stilled through the filling in of the 
gap between the mind and its object. It is in the middle region 
between these two limits that the conscious desires and ideas 
of men live. And such conscious desires and ideas come to be 
thought of as belonging to a continuous mind or self because 
of this same lack of immediacy between life processes and 
objects. · If each separate conation found its appropriate object 
and thereby came to immediate fruition, then each such impulse 
would be a separate fact, it would be born and it would die and 
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another take its place, but there would be no occasion for linking 
them all together as the desires and conations of a single self. 
This latter happens just because a desire, an idea, exists to which 
no immediate object corresponds. Objects are frag-mentary and 
discrete over against the existence of continuous desirings and 
strivings. These accordingly come to stand out against a world 
of objects and to live their own continuous life. Similarly, on 
the other ha.nd, the world of objects comes to be thought of as 
independent and continuous because our processes of dealing 
with these objects, our handling them, our perceiving, and our 
knowing them are in turn frag·mentary and discrete. The inter-
ruptions of sleep and of death, of turning from one set of objects 
to another, are interruptions in our life and conscious processes, 
and over against this discontinuity the permanence and coher-
ence of our world of objects stand out. From both sides then, 
from against the background of fragmentary and discrete 
objects, a world of continuous conscious processes belonging to 
a self, and against the backgrouncl of fragmentary, cliscontinuous 
conscious processes, a permanent world of objects, do we see 
the existence of that gap or distance between life processes and 
objects which consciousness and ideas come in to :fill. 6 
The situation thus defined which is characteristic of the life 
of mind in man, the distinction' between the self ancl its world 
and the existence of ideas as contents of consciousness differ-
ing from objects immediately in cm;itact with the organism, 
undoubtedly originates in the behavior situations with which the 
higher animals and notably man are confronted, and with which 
they are compelled to cope. Instinctive behavior precedes the 
emergence of mind and of ideas, but to recognize this need not 
blind one to whatever new and emergent qualities make their 
appearance once mind and ideas do come upon the scene of 
nature and of history. What this first consideration or motive 
points out is that when you approach the problem of mind 
wholly from the point of view of life processes interacting with 
G Cf. Simmel, Lebensanschmmngen, passim. 
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the physical objects of their environment, you will not be in 
a position even to recognize any such gap or distance between 
them. because from. such a point of view there can only be an 
immediacy of contact in the space-time continuum. of the animal 
body and its world. 
I turn to our second consideration. It has to do with the 
range or extent of the contact between the organism. and its 
Wl)rld. What we have metaphorically spoken of as a distance 
between these two makes possible a greater breadth and scope 
of contact. Just as the farther removed one is from. an object 
the more can he take in in a single view, so organisms which 
touch nature directly and immediately, with no intervening 
gap, come in contact with their world only at some one focal 
point, some particular local object, felt or sensed in its isolation. 
Remove the organism. to a distance ( in the metaphorical sense), 
and permit ideas to intervene between it and its world, and the 
organism., though less immediately in contact with its objects, 
touches the world not at a focal point but over a broad surface. 
Ideas, which come to exist when the immediate continuity of life 
processes and objects is broken and which in a sense come to fill 
in the gap thus created, possess the capacity of spreading over 
a surface, of representing and being the sym.bois of what is not 
immediate. The difference between touch and vision is a differ-
ence in the area of contact between the animal body and its 
physical world. The area of contact in vision is enormously 
larger than in direct touch. At best the surface of the body 
could never touch any surface larger than itself, as when one 
is swimming under water, and felt surfaces are usually very. 
much smaller than the total body surface. But vision, which is 
a distant touch, may cover an area many thousand .or million 
times larger than the body, as when we see at night half the 
surface of distant suns. But the scope of vision of the mind's 
eye which sees through the medium. not of sense organs but 
of ideas cannot be completely represented by any quantitative 
increase, however great, in the area of contact between the organ-
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ism and its world. There does come. with ideas a quantitative 
increase, as when I think or imagine the part of the room behind 
me together with the parts in front of me which I see, or when 
I think of the outlines, not of the map of Africa, but of the real 
continent itself. But the characteristic achievement of ideas lies 
elsewhere. For, it is a different dimension of objects, of nature, 
and of reality which becomes accessible to us through ideas from 
that which is increasingly revealed as touch develops into vision. 
When I say, then, that the area of contact between minds and 
their environment which ideas render possible is broader than 
any physical surface belonging in common to the bodily organ-
ism and the physical objects in the space-time world, I am using 
again a figure of speech. What ideas allow us to be in contact 
with,-again the figure of speech-what ideas enable us to know, 
are aspects, surfaces, and dimensions of our world which can-
not in any physical sense impinge upon the body. I shall cite 
three instances. First, ideas can spread out beyond the present 
into the past and future, yet all that exists as far as physical 
efficacy is concerned at any present time is only the present. 
To know the past is to know the non-existent and the non.-
efficacious, at least that which is non-existent and non-efficacious 
in the sense in which such predicates are applicable to the 
present. To reply that since time is a reality therefore the 
present real moment is linked to an equally real past in the 
same way that, because of the reality of space, my body is linked 
to the distant sun which I see, is to ignore one meaning of the 
belief in the reality of time. If time is real, the past does not 
now exist as does the present. It is not unreal because true 
judgments about it, and false ones, can be made. But the past 
is no part of the physically existent present world, though the 
accumulations and effects of the past may be. No refinement 
or increase in power of any sense organ would disclose the past. 
If reality is envisaged solely in terms of bodily life processes 
interacting with a physical environment, there not only is no 
past in the sense in which there is always a moving present, but 
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what once existed and is now real as a past event could not be 
known to have been so. The distant in time, unlike the distant 
in space, and because of the very reality of time, cannot itself 
impinge upon any present process. 
A second instance of a dimension which cannot be disclosed 
to any physical process, and which is revealed through ideas, is 
that of universals. On this point, if I read him rightly, I find 
myself unable to follow Alexander. That a universal is a "pat-
tern of configuration in any existent,'' and. that such a form 
or configuration, as exemplirfied in any pa.rticiilar exitStent, is a 
part of the object as sensed or perceived just as much as are its 
particular, non-categorial qualities, seem to me important and 
true propositions. But the form, the configuration, the universal 
as thus perceived, is not perceived as a universal. I as truly 
perceive the pattern woven into the piece of tapestry as I per-
ceive its frayed edges. Boyle's law is woven into the pressure 
of a particular gas against the walls of its container just as the 
pattern is woven into the tapestry. The universal constitutes 
the form or law of the thing perceived. But while the particular 
thing or process, including both the configuration as particular-
ized and the accidents of its particularization, impinge upon the 
body in the space-time continuum, I cannot see that the con-
figuration, the universal as such does so. Nature let fall the 
apple on Newton's head, but not the law of gravitation. To 
envisage the configuration, the law of things, is to have access 
to a dimension of things which no quantitative increase in the 
refinement and range of sense organs, no further progress in 
the line of development from touch to vision, could yield. What 
Santayana says of the searchlight theory of the mind, in which 
the mind is equated with the collection of objects lighted up-
increase the area of that field as you will-holds here as well: 
'' to think you have composed consciousness by collecting its 
objects is like thinking you have created knowledge by collecting 
a library.'' The knowledge may well be in the library, but it 
is only the collection of books which is physically continuous 
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with my bodily processes-. Like the past, the universal, when 
it is known as- such and not merely sensed in its particular 
embodiment, belongs to a dimension different from that of exist-
ent objects in the space-time continuum. In both cases ideas, 
or some contents of consciousness akin to the nature of ideas, 
constitute the vehicle through which we have access to these 
dimensions of reality. 
In addition to the real past which no longer exists and 
universals which are not coincident with the particular struc-
tlues which embody them, there is a third class of entities which 
I find difficulty in locating in any process within the space-
time continuum. I refer to meanings. The crucial question 
here is not whether the apprehension of meanings corresponds 
with or is even identical with some neural process. The meaning 
as conscious, i.e., the apprehension of meaning is a process, a 
passage of events in time, and if the process is a neural one, in 
space as well. But the meaning· as apprehended is a structure 
which possesses a fixity, an immobility, which renders it unfit 
to be a moment of or a cross-section of a process. The sentence, 
'' the wind is blowing the fallen leaf and the kitten is running 
after it,'' stabilizes and arrests in the world of meanings a 
process of lively animation and change. 'l'he meaning and also 
the truth of the statement is an arrested form, a '' concretion 
in discourse,'' as Santayana has called it, and this arrested 
form inhabits neither the objective scene where wind, leaf, ancl 
kitten disport themselves, nor the conscious, verbal, or neural 
process of uttering the sentence or apprehending its meaning. 
The meaning or truth would subsist if both the objective scene 
and the conscious process were annihilated as indeed they are 
by the passage of time. James has called this the principle 
of '' constancy in the mind's meanings.'' '' Amid the flux of 
opinions and of physical things," he says, "the world of con-
ceptions, of things intended to be thought about, stands stiff 
and immutable, like Plato's realm of ideas.'' And this '' sense 
of sameness,'' he declares-, '' is the very keel and backbone of 
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our thinking.'' I think we can say even more than this. We 
have here, I believe, an instance and a witness in our conscious 
life of a feature of reality which is universal and pervasive, 
a categorical quality, which I am inclined to suspect holds 
out a greater promise of pointing the way to a metaphysics 
than any other single aspect of our world. The processes of 
nature, of life, of history, and of mind become concentrated in 
and focussed upon discrete objects, forms, structures, institu-
tions, individuals, and meanings. I feel less sure about the 
relation between process and form in inorganic nature, but the 
view which Alexander has set forth with such persuasive power 
lends itself to this interpretation. Whether or not physical 
things are coag·ulations and configurations of space-time, momen-
tary embodiments of the continuohs flow of processes which 
destroy them as well as form them, certain it is that life processes 
become stabilized in discrete forms, individuals, and types. In 
the processes of history. and of society, fixed institutions arise, 
civilizations, laws, and customs which in turn are clestroy~d by 
the processes which engendered them, and make place for other 
fixed forms. Likewise the stream of conscious processes becomes 
concentrated upon individual interests, meanings, and values, 
concretions in discourse, which once formed and apprehended 
are in turn discarded and replaced by new forms. The wor Id 
of nature, of history, of mind is neither exclusively a world of 
process, of the lJassag·e of events, nor a world of eternal forms 
and substances. It is a world of mutual intercourse between 
.processes and form. But there exists a fundamental discrepancy 
and tension between process and form because processes are 
continuous and dynamic while forms are discrete _and immobile. 
The processes of nature, of life, of history, and of mind over-
flow ancl engulf the forms and individual structures which they 
create and which embody for a moment the life of things. And 
these successive discrete forms redirect and modify the ceaseless 
flow of process. The dialectic of nature, of history, and of mind 
is empirically discoverable after the event, but it is not capable 
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of any prior wholesale deduction because it is not prefigured 
in any existent totality given once for all. This would be the 
ground of my dissent from any metaphysical Absolutism in 
the fashion of Hegel, such for instance as is implied in the 
question which Bosanquet puts thus: ''What, then, is the contra-
diction which drives the reality from form to form, if it is 
not the contrast of each with an immanent whole 1' '7 It is not 
the contrast and contradiction between a fragment and a totality, 
but that between process and form, between continuity and 
discreteness, between what Alexander calls the '' inherent rest-
lessness of time,'' and the fixed, discrete definiteness of forms 
and structures, of meanings and individuals. I may have said 
enough merely to suggest in outline an organizing and directive 
idea, different from that of life processes inserted within 
nature's processes, different from that of the flow of organic 
behavior, and more apt, it seems to me, to disclose and to define 
the life and habitat of mind. 
But there is a further consideration which bears up,on the 
adequacy of the organizing concept of bodily processes continu-
ous with nature's processes and, in consequence, of the three 
theories of mind in which that directive idea is displayed. This 
further consideration to which I now turn becomes more intelli-
gible in the light of the tension and discrepancy, just noted, 
between continuous processes and discrete forms and structures. 
Ideas, we have seen, may be said, metaphorically at least, to fi]l 
in the gap which comes to exist between the life processes of 
animal boa:ies and the external world when the continuity 
between and the adaptation of organism tQ environment can 
no longer be maintained through the mechanism of instinct. 
Ideas, like sense organs, exist between the organism and its 
world, and they inevitably come thereby to play a double role 
and to lead a double life. They are possessions of the organism 
or self, instruments in the furtherance of its activities and 
7 Bosanquet, The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, 
p. 58. 
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interests, and they are at the same time disclosures and symbols 
of external objects. Ideas are the meeting points of life 
processes and conations, and of. the objects and events which 
go their own way in the environing world of nature. Ideas have 
their internal and their external meanings. They are moments 
or eddies in the stream of consciousness, and they are also the 
impressions and echoes of nature's objects. Pragmatism sees· 
ideas chiefly or wholly as embedcled iri the flow of behavior, tools 
which the self uses to relieve the tension of obstructed needs ancl 
interests. Realism tends to view ideas as identical with objects, 
or as symbols of objects. 'l'he paradox or anomaly of knowledge 
lies in the demand that they shall be both these things and 
thereby serve two masters, that they shall be effectively present 
in the momentary pulse of conscious life, and also the witness 
to and the revelation of a world which stretches into past and 
future, and out into dimensions encompassing the nature of 
things. Ideas are those significant moments in the stream of 
consciousness which reveal objective meanings. 
Now this consideration with respect to the status of ideas 
prepares us to observe a problematic situation with which any 
adequate theory of mind has to reckon. Any process, whether 
of life or of consciousness, possesses a characteristic relational 
structure, whether of causality or of the sheer restlessness of 
time. There are universal categorial qualities which belong 
to process as such, qualities which are perhaps deducible from 
the general nature of a continuum, and there are besides the 
biological characteristics of life processes ancl the psychological 
traits of mind processes. The life of ideas will share in the 
relational structure, the logic of process as such, of life processes, 
and of conscious processes. For ideas are certainly moments 
and episodes in the life history of individual streams of conscious-
ness, of selves. But the who,le story as to the sort of system, of 
relational structures, with which icleas are involved and into 
which they enter, is not thereby completely told. For ideas 
also reveal objective meanings. This reference to objective 
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meanings is so intimate and so closely woven into the nature 
and function of ideas as conscious entities, that we are almost 
justified in· saying that ideas are meanings as well as moments 
in a process. Now it is to be noted that the relations subsisting 
between meanings and contents, forming thereby what James in 
the last chapter of his Psychology calls '' ideal systems,'' are not 
the same as the relations subsisting between moments in a time 
process. The logic of a series of events comprising a process 
is not the same as the logic of a set of elements comprising an 
ideal system. That they are necessarily different is suggested 
by the fact already referred to, that processes are continuous, 
whereas ~eanings, like forms and individuals, · are discrete. 
Consider, as an illustration, the history of mathematical ideas. 
The discovery of mathematical truths has been a historical 
process occurring in time, and effected by individual minds 
attached to animal bodies and carried along in the stream of 
social processes, in the development of civilization. Mathematical 
ideas are strewn along the course of history in the career of . 
European civilization. In the same way the emergence of 
mathematical ideas in the life history of an individual forms a 
part of his biography. But mathematical ideas form not only 
such a time series of moments in an historical and biographical 
process. They are elements within a logical structure of mathe-
matical meanings and truths, and such a structure is an objective 
system defined by relations other than those which any descrip-
tion of the course of a life process would disclose. As elements 
of such a system they have an intrinsic logic od: their own inde-
pendent of the logic or relational structure of the life and mind 
processes of an animal body or of a civilization living in history. 
And in so far as the emergence of mathematical ideas in history 
or in the life of an individual has been the emergence of true 
ideas, the course of these processes has been constrained not · 
by the requirements and the logic of life processes, but by that 
of the ideal or idea system of mathematical truths. 
. ' 
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.A similar relation characterizes wide and pervasive regions 
of hum.an experience in which the activities of men's minds 
impinge upon those structures and meanings which are the 
objects of our knowledge and the instruments of ?ur practical 
interests. Men make tools. Their tool making originates in 
. some vital need, some felt want which stumbles upon some object 
in nature which can be fashioned for human use. The object 
thus enters as an instrument into the process of life's activities. 
But the use of the tool depends not only on the need which it 
serves and into which it fits, but in a degree fully as great or 
even greater, its use depends upon the objective structure, the 
independent grain of the stuff and qualities which belong to 
the tool itself. The artisan's use of the tool is as much guided 
by this objective grain and texture as by his own technical skill 
and purposes. The tool is the meeting point of the relational 
structure, the logic characteristic of the practical needs of the 
life process which creates and uses it, and also that of the inde-
pendent texture of the stuff comprising the tool. In a ~ense 
somewhat figurative to be sure, but not too remote from the 
facts, one may say that the tool, in so far as it is not wholly 
plastic, in so far as it has a nature of its own, ''uses' ' the 
activities and life processes of the artisan who, as we commonly 
say, uses it. Language is another instance of the same generic 
situation. Whatever may have been the origin of speech, it 
comes to serve as an instrument both for fixing and elaborating 
our meanings, for conceptual analysis and synthesis, and for 
social communication. But language like everything objective, 
including the products of human activity and invention, once it 
exists, possesses a relational structitre, a texture and logic, even 
a momentum of its own. In the use of language our thought 
processes in some measure always follow along and are guided 
by the suggestions and implic_ations of this objective word struc-
ture of language. Here it becomes less figurative to say that 
when we carry on a course either of thought or of conversation 
it is language which uses us and which speaks in us as well 
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as we who use language. This would appear to be the element 
of truth in the view maintained from Hobbes to Dewey that 
speech reactions constitute the essence of all thinking. 
The structures and institutions which comprise man's social 
environment must originally have been the outward deposit 
and projection of the energies residing within his nature. Cus-
tom and law, government and industry, must have sprung from 
man's instinctive life processes and needs. But once they exist 
they too, like tools and like language, possess a relational struc-
ture, a log·ic and a momentum of their o-wn which is not identical 
with that of the processes which originally engendered them. 
The result is that individuals are always to some extent caught 
up in the machinery of social structures and carried along by 
the momentum not of their own nature, their own purposes and 
desires, but by that of the objective social institutions in which 
their own lives are embedded. The actions of men in history 
and society constitute the meeting point of the relational stri1c-
ture, the log·ic of their individual life processes and that of the 
social environment to which they belong. 
So it is with ideas, to which we may come back. I have been 
making various suggestions by way of analogy in order to 
clarify the relation between the mind's processes whereby we 
apprehend meanings, and the contents or objects of our ideas, 
the meanings apprehended. Not only do meanings, as fixed, 
discrete entities not exist within the continuum of any time 
process; not only are meanings and universals, past and future, 
not located in the intercourse between the life processes of the 
body and that continuous passage of events which is nature. 
The range of meanings and truths apprehended by ideas, and 
the objects of men's practical and ideal interests as well, con-
stitute systems possessing an objective structure of their own 
and which become increasingly disclosed in the human life of 
reason. These objective structures stand for dimensions of the 
total and real environment of men's minds; they elicit and 
direct the course of ideas and of practical interests which com-
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prise the life of the mind. Meanings, though known by ideas, 
do not reside solely in the processes of consciousness. Nor can 
the term nature be stretched sufficiently wide to include these 
significant structures which are the objects and the habitat of 
our ideas. The last chapter of James 's Psychology from which 
I have borrowed the term' ideal system,' and whose metaphysical 
importance it would be hard to exaggerate, is an exposition of 
the contrast between the relational structure of experience, i.e., 
"the way in which reality exists or the way in which it comes 
before us,'' and the '' order of scientific thought.'' This chapter 
supplies a commentary on the achievement of .Alexander, whose 
central view is that the time-space continuum of nature, as it 
emerges into life and mind, provides the matrix, the scene and 
locus of all ideas and meanings, all knowledge and values. It is 
the thesis of James in this chapter, first, that the ideal systems 
of science, art, and morality are incongruent with the relational 
structure of reality as presented in experience, and second, that 
these ideal systems, these internal relations which enter the 
mind "by the back stairs as it were, or rather have not entered 
the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born in the house,' '8 that 
these ideal systems or ideas furnish a guicle to the mind in its 
intercourse with its world. Thus, '' the relations of resemblance 
and difference among thing·s have nothing to do with the time 
and space order in which we may experience the latter." But 
the relation of resemblance is for James the generating principle 
of a rational ideal system which becomes exemplified in all our 
exact knowledge of nature. His conclusion is that '' the mind 
is filled with necessary and eternal relations which it finds 
between certain of its ideal conceptions, and which form a 
determinate system, independent of the order of frequency in 
which experience may have associated the conception's originals 
in time and space.' '9 In scientific knowledge we fling this net-
work over outer realities. We learn to look out upon the passage 
s James, Psychology, II, 627. 
9 Ibid., p. 661. 
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of events in nature's processes through the medium of an ideal 
system possessing the sort of relational structure which is the 
fitting habitat of the mind. I quote once more from Jam.es. 
'' Thousands of years ago,'' he says, '' men started to cast the 
chaos of nature's sequences and juxtapositions into a form that 
might seem intelligible. Many were their ideal prototypes of 
rational order: teleological and aesthetic ties between things, 
causal and substantial bonds, as well as logical and mathematical 
relations. The most promising of these ideal systems at first 
were of course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The baldest 
and least promising were the mathematical ones; but the history 
of the latter's application is a history of steadily advancing 
successes, whilst that of the sentimentally richer systems is one 
of relative sterility and failure.' '10 Sterility and failure, it 
should be added, so far as a scientific knowledge of nature is 
concerned; but not wholly so if we are to recognize, as I think 
we must, that significant idea structures other than . mathe-
matical and scientific systems also comprise the habitat of mind 
as it increasingly discovers the nature of its own life and that 
of its world. These significant idea structures, like tools, lan-
guage, and the fabric o•f social institutions, have a grain and 
logic of their own. We think them and when our minds live 
in them, they use us and live in us. 
There is a certain ambiguity as to what it might mean to 
write the natural history of mind. One might begin by describ-
ing the way in which animal bodies are inserted within and 
surrounded by the processes of nature. Animal bodies are 
themselves processes and are continuous with those of nature. 
A natural history of mind will take its departure from the active 
intercourse between bodily life processes and the physical objects 
and events in the environment. It will observe the emergence 
of a situation in which this continuity between life processes 
and the physical environment is, in some measure, broken. It 
will observe a delay in the response, at first wholly physiological 
10 James, Psychology, II, 665. 
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and instinctive, to the stimuli which surrounding objects afford. 
This pause in the flow of behavior brings it about that the object 
impinging upon the animal's body at some sense organ is not 
merely an isolated physical object, but a sign of other and dis-
tant physical objects. It is perceived and it acquires a meaning. 
The organism comes to be inserted' into nature's processes not 
only at a thin momentary point, but to touch nature over a 
surface, broader than the present moment. Memory and antici-
pation build up and add to the area of that contact. Ideas come 
to intervene between bodily life processes and the environment, 
and the career of mind is started on its way. But only started. 
For, the natural history of mind will recorcl the emergence, 
gradual, natural but momentous, of an environment different 
from that of physical objects, Man has a history; he lives in a 
social environment, and animals do not. By this is meant some-
thing more than that man lives in the presence of other animal 
bodies like his own, recognizing them as his fellows, herding, 
fighting, and cooperating· with them. Dogs and buffaloes do as 
much. The world in which man lives is full of the accumulated 
deposits of his social heritag·e, felt and known as such. It is in 
the intercourse of man ·with this social heritage and environment 
that interests, sentiments, beliefs, and loyalties are g·enerated, 
just as perceptions arise through the intercourse of animal bodies 
and physical objects. The history of mincl will observe and 
record the give and take, the mutual interdependence of these 
interests, beliefs, and sentiments, and the objective fabric of 
his social order and the processes of history. It will observe the 
energies of human nature taking on objective shape in customs 
and laws, political and economic institutions, and these in turn 
reacting back upon human nature, eliciting some of men's 
energies and providing no outlet for others. But a new chapter 
in the history of the mind opens when idea systems, which at 
first and for long are simply the means· of intercourse between 
the individual and his social ,;vorld, tied clown to the social 
structures which have engendered them, become released from 
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their social origins and begin to go their own way, determined 
by the inherent logic of significant thought structures. The life 
of reason and imagination, of science and art begin their career. 
These idea systems, generated by language and social cooper-
ation, invade morality and religion, they generate ideals of 
political and economic organization and, in scientific knowledge, 
they provide that medium of mathematical and logical thought 
structures through which men come to look out upon nature. 
So that the history of mind will have to record not only the 
emergence and the continuous support of the mind's processes 
in the processes of nature and of life, but the career and the 
logic of these idea systems, these sig'nificant structures in which 
the life of the mind is displayed. 
There is thus a double meaning which attaches to the phrase 
'the habitat of mind.' Our minds are, as existences, processes 
which are rooted in the life processes of animal bodies. In this 
sense our minds inhabit animal bodies. Now the processes of 
nature may be said to live in the time-space matrix or continuum 
which sustains them. But in another sense nature's processes 
live in the physical forms and structures which these continuous 
1wocesses generate and destroy. The processes of life also in 
one sense live amidst the physical energies of nature, the chem-
ical compounds which make life possible. In another no less 
real sense the processes of life live in the individual forms of 
plants and animals which comprise a discrete series of incli-
viduals thrown off and left behind by the onwarcl sweep of life's 
processes. Just so, the processes of history and of society live 
within the environing world of nature, seashore and moun-
tain, climate and race, but they too live in the concrete social 
structures and institutions in which the energies of history and 
of society take on individual form. Our minds live in our bodies 
in the same way that life processes live in the chemical com-
pounds and physical energies which sustain them, and in the 
same way that the processes of history live in the natural 
environment which provides the background of history. · But our 
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minds .live also in the objects and forms which we think and 
know, enjoy and love, in the interests and values to which our 
sentiments and loyalties are attached. Our minds live in the 
significant idea systems in which the life of mind is displayed, 
just as life processes live in individual forms, and the processes 
of history in social structures. 
If now we mean by the habitat of mincl the system of ener-
gies and structures which have engendered and which sustain 
mind, then we shall say that mind inhabits animal bodies of a 
certain clegree of complexity in their active intercourse with 
their environment. We shall have in the same sense to say also 
that minds inhabit the processes of history and of society. These 
too contribute to the formation of the mind. But if we mean 
by the habitat of the mind, as we well may, the structures ancl 
objects in which the mind's processes eventuate, the forms in 
which the process becomes clisplayed, then we will say that the 
mind inhabits the significant objects to which it is attachecl 
throug·h knowledge, interest, and appreciation, and that · these 
significant structures comprise the habitat of mind. 
